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ABSTRACT
Most analysts of the modern Latin American economy believe that it has
always had very high levels of inequality. Indeed, some have argued that high
inequality appeared very early in the post-conquest Americas, and that this
fact supported rent-seeking and anti-growth institutions that help explain the
disappointing growth performance we observe there even today. This paper
argues to the contrary. Compared with the rest of the world, Latin American
inequality was not high either in pre-conquest 1491 or in the post-conquest
decades following 1492. Indeed, it was not even high in the mid-19th century
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just before Latin America’s belle e´poque. It only became high thereafter.
Historical persistence in Latin American inequality is a myth.
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RESUMEN
La mayorı´a de los ana´lisis sobre la economı´a latinoamericana con-
tempora´nea creen que siempre ha tenido muy altos niveles de desigualdad. A
decir verdad, algunos han argumentado que los altos niveles de desigualdad
aparecieron en e´pocas muy tempranas en la Ame´rica posterior a la Conquista.
Esto supondrı´a la existencia de instituciones buscadoras de renta y no propi-
ciatorias del crecimiento lo que nos ayudarı´a a explicar los problemas de
desarrollo que observamos incluso hoy en dı´a. Este artı´culo argumenta lo
contrario. Comparada con el resto del mundo, la desigualdad en Latinoame´rica
no era alta en los an˜os anteriores a la Conquista de 1491, y no fue alta en las
de´cadas posteriores que siguieron a 1492. En realidad, no fue alta a mitad del
siglo XIX en los an˜os anteriores a la belle e´poque en Latinoame´rica. So´lo llego´
a ser alta posteriormente. La persistencia histo´rica de la desigualdad en
Latinoame´rica es un mito.
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1. LATIN AMERICAN INEQUALITY OVER FIVE CENTURIES
Most analysts of the modern Latin American economy carry a pessimistic
belief in historical persistence; that is, they believe that Latin America has always
had very high levels of income and wealth inequality, suggesting that it will be
hard, or even impossible, for modern policy to create a more egalitarian society.
The persistence view is based on little or no comparative evidence. Yet, when
modern analysts see a more unequal Latin America compared with Asia and the
rich post-industrial nations (Lo´pez and Perry 2008), they assume that this has
always been true. Indeed, some have argued that high inequality appeared very
early in the post-conquest Americas, and that it supported rent-seeking and anti-
growth institutions that helps explain the disappointing growth performance we
observe there even today. This paper argues to the contrary. Compared with the
rest of the world, inequality was not high in pre-conquest 1491, nor was it high
in the post-conquest decades following 1492. Indeed, it was not even high in the
mid-19th century just before Latin America’s belle e´poque. It only became high
thereafter. Historical persistence in Latin American inequality is a myth.
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2. LATIN AMERICA IN CONTEXT: WHAT DID PRE-INDUSTRIAL
INEQUALITY LOOK LIKE THE WORLD ROUND?1
We have no evidence documenting inequality for the Inca, Aztec or other
indigenous civilizations in the Americas before the arrival of the Iberian
conquerors2; but we can guess. Recently, Branko Milanovic, Peter Lindert
and myself (2008; hereafter MLW) collected what we call an «ancient
inequality» database for twenty-nine places, ranging over two millennia from
the Roman empire in the year 14, Byzantium in the year 1000, England in
1290, Tuscany in 1427, Holland in 1732, Old Castille in 1752, France in 1788,
Java in 1880 and British India in 1947. The MLW sample includes four Latin
American observations: Nueva Espan˜a 1790, Chile 1865, Brazil 1872 and
Peru 1876, although a new Mexican 1844 inequality observation, an 1870
Brazil observation and three 1870 Southern Cone observations can now be
added to the Latin American pre-industrial sample. These twenty-nine MLW
inequality observations have been constructed mainly from what are called
social tables, sources that report average income and income recipients by
social classes, but no income variance within them.
Social tables are particularly useful in evaluating ancient societies in which
classes were clearly delineated, where the differences in mean incomes between
them were substantial, and where mobility between them was trivial. If class
(and race) alone determined one’s income, and if income differences between
classes were large, while income differences within classes were small (mainly
reflecting life-cycle status and luck), then most inequality would be explained by
average income differences between classes. One of the most famous social
tables was constructed by Gregory King for England and Wales in 1688 (Lindert
and Williamson 1982). King’s class list was fairly detailed (thirty-one in num-
ber), but he did not report inequalities within these social groups, so we cannot
identify within-class inequality for 1688 England. Yet, when income variance
within class is also available for any pre-industrial country offering social table
estimates, the differences between measured inequality are typically very small
whether within class variance is included or not. In short, the lion’s share of
inequality in pre-industrial societies is and was accounted for by between-class
average income differences.
Figure 1 reports what the ancient inequality data look like. The Gini
estimates are plotted against income (GDI per capita). The figure also dis-
plays what is called the inequality possibility frontier (IPF; solid line), a curve
based on the maximum inequality that the elite could have extracted at
that income per capita. The maximum is constructed under the assumption
that everybody but the elite in such repressive societies would have gotten
1 As will be apparent, this and the next section draw heavily on Milanovic et al. (2008).
2 Well, almost none. But, see footnote 9 in which some archaeological «architecture inequality»
is reported.
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just the World Bank’s subsistence minimum of $PPP 3003. The ratio of the
actual inequality to the maximum feasible inequality is called the extraction
ratio. In most cases, the calculated pre-industrial Ginis lie pretty close to the
IPF. The countries farthest below the IPF curve — with the lowest extraction
ratios — are the most advanced pre-industrial economies in northwestern
Europe; that is, 1561-1808 Holland, 1788 France and 1688-1801 England.
The IPF allows us to better situate these ancient pre-industrial inequality
estimates in a modern context (Milanovic et al. 2008, Table 1). Brazil has often
FIGURE 1
ANCIENT INEQUALITIES: ESTIMATED GINI COEFFICIENTS AND THE
INEQUALITY POSSIBILITY FRONTIER
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Source: Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008, Figure 2).
3 This is less than Maddison’s (1998, p. 12) assumed subsistence minimum of $PPP 400 which,
in principle, covers more than physiological needs. Note that a purely physiological minimum
«sufficient to sustain life with moderate activity and zero consumption of other goods» (Bairoch
1993, p. 106) was estimated by Bairoch to be $PPP 80 at 1960 prices, or $PPP 355 at 1990 prices.
Our minimum is also consistent with the World Bank absolute poverty line that is 1.08 per day per
capita in 1993 $PPP (Chen and Ravallion 2007, p. 6). This works out to be about $PPP 365 per
annum in 1990 international prices. Since more than a billion people are believed to have incomes
less than the World Bank global poverty line, it seems reasonable to assume that the physiological
minimum income must be less.
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been cited as an example of an extremely unequal society, driven by a long
history of slavery, racial discrimination and regional dualism. Indeed, Brazil’s
Gini in 2002 is comparable to the most unequal pre-industrial societies in our
ancient inequality sample. But modern Brazil is more than four times richer
than the average ancient society in our sample, so its maximum feasible
inequality (92.7) is much higher than our ancient society average (60.6). Thus,
modern Brazilian elites have extracted only a little more than 63 per cent of the
maximum feasible inequality in Brazil, and its inequality extraction ratio is
about the same as what we find among the least exploitative and repressive
ancient societies like 1801-1803 England and 1886 Japan. What is true of
Brazil, is also true of contemporary Chile, Mexico and Peru. All three have
Ginis today well above the world average (Chile 2003554.6, Mexico
2000553.8 and Peru 2002552 vs. the world average540.6), but all three have
extraction ratios below the least exploitative in our ancient societies’ sample.
Most Latin American societies — at least those that we can document —
have higher Ginis today than what they had in the mid-19th century. Indeed,
since independence inequality has fallen in only one Latin American republic
for which data exist — Chile 1870559.4 to 2003554.6, or down about 8 per
cent. But inequality has been on the rise in the other three Latin American
republics for which data exist: Mexico 1844551.3 to 2000553.8, up 5 per cent;
Brazil 1870554.8 to 2002558.8, up 7 per cent; and Peru 1876542.2 to
2002552, up 23 per cent. But what about extraction rates? As a country
becomes richer, and its surplus above subsistence rises, its feasible inequality
expands. Consequently, even if recorded inequality is stable, the extraction ratio
will fall. It follows that the social consequences of increased inequality may
not entail as much relative impoverishment, or as much perceived injustice,
as might appear if we only look at the Gini. This logic is particularly compelling
for low- and middle-income societies in which increases in income push the
maximum feasible inequality up sharply along the steepest part of the IPF
curve. The farther a society rises above subsistence, the less will economic
development lift its inequality possibilities, and thus the extraction ratio will be
driven more and more by the rise in the actual Gini itself. Thus, the inequality
extraction ratio has fallen everywhere in Latin America over the past century or
two, and in some cases by a lot; it has fallen by 33 per cent in Brazil (from 94 in
1870 to 63.4 in 2002), by 27 per cent in Chile (from 77.3 in 1870 to 56.4 in 2003),
by 47 per cent in Mexico (from 105.5 in 1790 to 56.2 in 2000) and by 27 per cent
in Peru (from 78.1 in 1876 to 56.7 in 2002). While the rest of this paper will
focus on actual or measured inequality, future debates over social justice and
economic development will have to struggle with the implications of different
trends in actual inequality and extraction ratios4.
4 The extraction ratio and the IPF relate well to the Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) notion of
elite power. They see its maximization as a function of the expected rent that the exploitative
institutions can extract (times one minus the probability of a popular uprising) minus the cost of
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3. FUNDAMENTALS: EXPLAINING PRE-INDUSTRIAL INEQUALITY
THE WORLD ROUND
Table 1 attempts to explain differences in pre-industrial inequality. The
Kuznets hypothesis posits that inequality tends to follow a bell shape as
average real income increases. Although Kuznets formulated his hypothesis
explicitly with a view toward industrializing and industrialized economies,
one might wonder whether his curve is even more apparent among our pre-
industrial economies as well. After all, the secular upswing could be easily
explained by increases in per capita income: poor countries do not have
much surplus for the elite to extract, but as income rises in pre-industrial
economies, so does the surplus and potential inequality. In addition to log
average income and its square, Table 1 includes the urbanization rate,
population density and colonial status (a dummy variable). The regression
also includes a number of controls for country-specific eccentricities in the
data: the number of social groups available for calculating the Gini, whether
the social table is based on tax data and whether the social table for a colony
includes the income of resident colonists. The Kuznets hypothesis predicts a
positive coefficient on average income (or its log) and negative coefficient on
its square. We also expect higher inequality for the more urbanized countries
(Ravallion et al. 2007) and for those that are ruled by foreign elites since
powerful colonizers are presumed to be able to achieve higher extraction
rates than weaker local elites, and since countries with weak local elites but
with large surpluses, will attract powerful colonizers to extract it (Acemoglu
et al. 2001, 2002).
The empirical results confirm all expectations. Both income terms are of
the right sign and significant, supporting a pre-industrial Kuznets curve. The
sign on the urbanization rate is, as predicted, positive, but since it competes
with population density, its statistical significance is somewhat lower. Still,
each percentage point increase in the urbanization rate (say, from 10 to 11
per cent) is associated with an increase in the Gini by 0.35 points. Holding
everything else constant, colonies had a Gini almost 13 points higher than
non-colonies5. Foreigner is a dummy variable that controls for two observa-
tions (South Serbia 1455 and Levant 1596) that were colonies but where
their ancient inequality surveys did not report the incomes and numbers of
colonizers at the top. This is therefore simply another control for data
eccentricity, and its negative sign shows that being a colony, but not having
colonizers included in the survey, reduces recorded inequality considerably
(9-10 points). The number of social groups used in the inequality calculations,
(F’note continued)
suppressing the probability of an uprising. Since the IPF traces out the maximum feasible
inequality, it takes both the suppression cost and uprising probability as zero.
5 This is a correlation only. The causal relation cannot be identified with this regression.
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or tax census origin of social tables, do not affect the Gini in any significant
way. This finding is comforting, because it shows that our estimates of
inequality are being driven by fundamentals, not by the way the social tables
were constructed by pre-industrial observers.
Population density is negatively associated with inequality. It might have
been expected that the introduction of a dummy variable for more densely
populated Asia would have caused the effect of density to dissipate. This is
TABLE 1
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE GINI COEFFICIENT
1 2 3
GDP per capita 360.5*** 366.7*** 360.2***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
GDP per capita squared 225.0*** 225.5*** 225.0***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Urbanization rate 0.349* 0.354* 0.353*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.093)
Population density 20.105*** 20.100*** 20.107*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.053)
Number of groups 20.009 20.009 20.010
(0.16) (0.19) (0.18)
Colony (0-1) 12.63*** 12.93*** 12.41***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Foreigner (0-1) 29.59 29.97 29.26
(0.25) (0.25) (0.29)
Asia (0-1) 21.28
(0.69)
Tax survey (0-1) 24.86 24.85 24.85
(0.57) (0.24) (0.28)
Constant 21246*** 21266*** 21245***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Number observations 28 28 26
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.73 0.73
Notes: GDP per capita is in natural logs. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by
three, two and one asterisks, respectively; P-values are given in brackets.
Source: Milanovic et al. (2008, Table 3).
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not the case, as shown in column 2 of Table 1. The negative impact of
population density on inequality seems to be counter-intuitive. After all,
conventional theory — which we will explain below — would predict that
more population pressure on the land should raise land yields and land rents,
lower labor’s marginal product and the wage, thus producing more
inequality, not less. Furthermore, this effect should have been all the more
powerful in pre-industrial societies in which land and labor drove inequality,
not, as in modern societies, human capital and financial wealth. It seems
likely that this conventional effect is being offset in the ancient economy data
by two forces. First, densely populated agrarian societies also had lower per
capita income, so this may have been working against the conventional force
(since inequality rises with per capita income). Second, more densely popu-
lated agrarian societies must have had higher relative food prices than thinly
settled or frontier societies, so that nominal subsistence had to be much higher
to purchase the more expensive foodstuffs, lowering measured inequality and
the extraction ratio6. It seems likely that this force must have been most
powerful during the two millennia before the middle of the 19th century since
a world market for grains did not yet exist and thus local conditions dictated
the relative price of food (Studer 2008). This second offset has important
implications for comparing inequality in the labor-scarce and resource-
abundant Americas with labor-abundant and resource-scarce Europe, and
between the densely populated highlands in Mexico and the Andes relative to
the resource-abundant Southern Cone. However, it is less clear that it had the
same effect within countries over time, since the results in Table 1 rely almost
entirely on a cross section, not a time series.
The stylized picture that emerges is this inequality follows contours that are
consistent with the Kuznets curve hypothesis, a pre-industrial secular rise to a
peak, followed by a fall during the modern economic growth. It follows that
most of the pre-industrial Third World had probably reached very high levels of
inequality by the early 19th century before what is called the first global trade
boom. However, the extraction ratio tends to fall as income increases, even
during pre-industrial times. This fact would, of course, invite a European
colonist to plunder where the potential surplus was big, but where the local
elite had relaxed their extraction rate. We will return to this issue below.
Finally, note that the regression in Table 1 has no «globalization» vari-
able, like terms of trade booms or busts. The reason, of course, is that it
6 Rarely do even modern inequality studies assess the impact of different class-specific cost-of-
living trends on real inequality trends. We know that this mattered hugely in early modern Europe
(Hoffman et al. 2002), and we need to know whether it has also mattered at any time in Latin
America since 1491. When Latin America underwent her commodity export boom during the belle
e´poque, did the rise in food export prices in the Southern Cone serve to raise real inequality even
more than nominal inequality? Did it have the opposite effect in Mexico, which imported cheap corn
from the United States? And what about 20th century Latin American food exporters when their
terms of trade collapsed 1915-1940?
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confronts pre-industrial history, which, for this sample, is also before the first
great globalization boom starting in the early mid-19th century. We will have
much more to say about this below.
4. HAS LATIN AMERICA ALWAYS BEEN MORE UNEQUAL?
Has Latin America always been more unequal than other parts of the
world? Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997; Engerman et al.
2000) offered a hypothesis to account for Latin American growth under-
achievement during the two centuries following its independence. Their
thesis begins with the plausible assertion that high levels of income
inequality, and thus of political power, favor rich landlords and rent-seekers,
and thus the development of institutions which are compatible with rent-
seeking but incompatible with economic growth. Their thesis argues further
that high levels of Latin American inequality have their roots in the natural
resource endowments present when Iberia conquered and colonized the
region five centuries ago. Exploitation of the native population and of
imported African slaves, as well as their subsequent disenfranchisement,
reinforced the development of institutions incompatible with growth.
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) had no difficulty in collecting evidence that
confirmed high inequality, disenfranchisement and lack of suffrage in Latin
America compared with the northern United States. But what about com-
parisons with the rest of the world, and what about earlier?7 Oddly enough,
neither the Engerman–Sokoloff team nor its critics have confronted the
thesis with inequality evidence for the economic leaders in northwest Europe
at comparable pre-industrial stages; this is the comparison that matters, not
with industrial United States.
Table 2 presents inequality information for pre-industrial northwest
Europe (i.e. before 1800) and for pre-industrial Latin America (i.e. before
1880). For the former, we have observations from 1788 France, 1561 and
1732 Holland and 1688, 1759 and 1801 England and Wales. For the latter, we
have six observations: Mexico 1844, Peru 1876 and Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Uruguay 1870. Engerman and Sokoloff coined their hypothesis in terms
of actual inequality. According to that criterion, their thesis must be soundly
rejected. That is, the (population weighted) average Latin American Gini
(52.4) was no higher than that of northwest Europe (52.9). Furthermore, the
7 John Coatsworth argues that the Engerman–Sokoloff thesis has not held up well to scrutiny:
«what little quantitative evidence there is does not suggest that ownership of land, or other assets for
that matter, was more concentrated in Latin America than in the United States» (Coatsworth 2008,
p. 553). However, Coatsworth’s survey (Coatsworth 2008, Table 2, p. 553) of the land and wealth
distribution estimates for Latin America reveals that the first Latin America observations are for the
province of Buenos Aires in 1820 and 1838 and for Rio de Janeiro in 1830. He is not able to report
any colonial observations.
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TABLE 2
INEQUALITY IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL LATIN AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE COMPARED
Country Year Source of income data
Population
(thousands) Actual Gini
Maximum
feasible Gini Extraction ratio
Argentina 1870 Projections 1,830 52.2
Brazil 1870 Occupational census 10,167 54.8 58.3 0.940
Chile 1870 Occupational census 1,702 59.4 76.8 0.773
Mexico 1844 Social tables 7,447 51.3
Peru 1876 Social tables 2,469 42.2 54.0 0.781
Uruguay 1870 Occupational census 376 48.1
Latin America 23,991
Unweighted average 51.4 (52.1) (63.0) (0.827)
Weighted average 52.4 (53.2) (59.8) (0.890)
England 1688 Social tables 5,700 45.0 78.8 0.571
England 1759 Social tables 6,463 45.9 82.9 0.554
England 1801 Social tables 9,053 51.5 85.0 0.606
France 1788 Social tables 27,970 55.9 73.5 0.761
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TABLE 2 (Cont.)
Holland 1561 Tax census dwelling rents 983 56.0 73.4 0.766
Holland 1732 Tax census dwelling rents 2,023 61.1 85.2 0.717
Western Europe 52,192
Unweighted average 52.6 79.8 0.659
Weighted average 52.9 77.7 0.681
Sources: All western European observations and Peru are from Milanovic et al. (2008). The Mexican (1844) actual Gini is based on a social table for the
state of Quere´taro constructed by Amilcar Challu.
The Brazil and Southern Cone observations are from Be´rtola et al. (2010, Table 4). The weighted averages use population. The Latin American averages
in parentheses use only the three available observations.
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comparative inequality implications emerging for these social tables have been
confirmed recently by Rafael Dobado Gonza´les and Hector Garcia using an
inequality proxy — Maddison’s real GDP per capita relative to their unskilled
grain wage; according to their data, Mexico, Bolivia and Colombia all had less
inequality in 1820 than did the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, or
even Portugal and Spain (Dobado Gonza´les and Garcia 2009, Figure 18).
It is not true that pre-industrial Latin America was more unequal than pre-
industrial northwest Europe8. Thus, if inequality encouraged rent-seeking and
discouraged growth in Latin America, it must have done so just as powerfully
in northwest Europe where the industrial revolution first started! Since we
know that high inequality was consistent with industrial revolutions occurring
in northwest Europe, it is unclear why it should be inconsistent with them
in Latin America somewhat later. However, Latin America was poorer than
northwest Europe, and poorer societies have a smaller surplus for the elite
to extract. Thus, maximum feasible inequality was considerably lower and
extraction rates were considerably higher in Latin America than in northwest
Europe (0.89 vs. 0.68, Table 2). While measured inequality does not support the
Engerman–Sokoloff thesis, the extraction rate does. The Engerman–Sokoloff
team, their followers and their critics all need to decide which of these
inequality indicators matters for their hypothesis and why. To the extent that
political power determines the extraction ratio, then Daron Acemoglu and
James Robinson (2006) may be quite right in stressing political inequality
rather than just economic inequality.
5. BROAD SWEEP: RECONSTRUCTING LATIN AMERICAN
INEQUALITY TRENDS SINCE 1491
5.1. Initial conditions: what was Latin American inequality
like in 1491?
Table 3 uses the Gini regression equation 1 in Table 1, and estimates of
the dependent variables also reported in Table 3 to predict Ginis for Latin
America in 1491 before the arrival of the Iberians, shortly after the conquest
(call it 1492), in 1600, 1700, 1790, 1820 and 1870. Table 3 also predicts Ginis
for Mexico in 1820, 1844 and 1870. In addition, the table reports predictions
for five Latin American cases where we also have actual inequality estimates;
that is, Nueva Espan˜a 1790, Mexico 1844, Brazil 1870, Chile 1870 and Peru
1876. While the correlation between actual and predicted inequality for those
five cases is hardly perfect, it is positive and highly significant (R25 0.47),
8 See also the summaries on this point in Be´rtola et al. (2010, pp. 5-6) and Be´rtola (2009). It
should be added that ancient Asia was not significantly less unequal when we control for other
factors. Indeed, population density is sufficient to identify why ancient Asia had lower levels of
inequality than the rest of the pre-industrial world.
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TABLE 3
DATA USED FOR THE GINI PREDICTIONS AND THE GINIS
GDP per
capita
(1990 US$)
Urbanization
rate (%)
Colony
dummy
Density
(person/
km2) Gini coefficients
Actual Predicted
Latin
America
1491 416 11.0 0 1.60 22.5
1492 416 11.0 1 1.60 35.1
1600 438 9.0 1 0.78 36.2
1700 530 12.5 1 1.10 48.5
1790 650 14.2 1 1.14 57.6
1820 691 13.9 0 1.97 47.0
1870 676 15.0 0 3.68 46.4
Mexico
1790 710 9.1 1 4.96 63.5 57.7
1820 759 8.9 0 5.38 47.8
1844 718 9.2 0 6.41 51.3 46.1
1870 674 9.6 0 7.41 44.0
Brazil
1870
721 16.2 0 1.20 54.8 48.9
Chile
1870
1083 29.0 0 2.23 59.4 72.3
Peru
1876
653 15.0 0 1.92 42.2 45.4
Sources and notes:
GDP per capita: Maddison (2008), except Peru 1876 from Milanovic et al. (2008, Table 1). For Latin
America, Mexico and Brazil, 1790 is linearly interpolated between 1700 and 1820. For Chile 1790, the
Mexican growth rate from 1790 to 1820 is assumed.
Population: Maddison (2008). Missing years linearly interpolated.
Urbanization: Bairoch (1993, pp. 388-389, 423) and Sa´nchez-Albornoz (1974, pp. 30-32, 77). Latin
American 1820 interpolated. Mexico 1820 and 1870 derived by assuming per cent fall from 1790 to 1820
and rise from 1820 to 1870, the same as for Latin America.
Land area: Milanovic et al. (2008, Table 1).
Colony dummy: While Chile gained independence in 1818, the others did so shortly after 1820: Brazil
in 1822, Mexico in 1821, Peru in 1821, and a few even later. Yet, the colony dummy is still set equal to zero
in 1820 for Latin America and all four regions in the table.
Actual Gini: See text.
Predicted Gini: Data above are inserted into estimated regression, column 1, Table 1.
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a comforting result. Indeed, the only big deviant of predicted inequality from
actual is 1870 Chile, where relatively high urbanization and GDP per capita
drive up the predicted Gini. Without the Chilean observation, R2 is 0.82.
Table 3 implies that the Gini coefficient in Latin America before the arrival
of the Iberians was 22.5, which would have made it the society with the lowest
inequality in the pre-industrial world (Figure 1), and Aztec archeological evi-
dence would seem to confirm it9. China in 1880 had a Gini of 24.5, very close to
pre-conquest Latin America. Dutch colonial Java had a Gini in 1880 of 39.7, a
figure which would have been 27.1 without the Dutch colonists (according to
the MLW regression, 39.7212.6527.1). Thus, Table 3 implies that pre-conquest
Latin America had modest levels of inequality much like all the other poor
pre-industrial societies that had escaped from being colonized.
5.1.1. Extracting the surplus: what was the colonial impact
like after 1492?
Given what we know about ancient pre-industrial economies the world
around, and assuming that Iberian colonists were no better or worse at
extracting surplus than were the other colonizers in the ancient inequality
sample (England, Holland and the Ottoman Turks), the answer to this question
is quite simple. Colonies had higher Gini coefficients by 12-13 percentage points
(Table 1), so the Latin American Gini coefficient might have drifted up from
22.5 in 1491 to something like 35 in the post-1492 decades. Perhaps it was in
fact a bit lower or a bit higher, but inequality clearly must have increased by
about half during the first decades after the Iberian conquest.
Not only did the Iberian elite replace the indigenous elite, but, if they were
anything like the English, the Dutch and the Turks, the Iberians must have been
able (or willing) to raise the extraction rate in their favor by a lot. In his recent
magisterial survey of colonial Mexico, Richard Salvucci reminds us how the
Spaniards used «elements of compulsion, coercion and force y especially in
labor markets» and notes that «the free market was not the Spaniards’ ally, at
least to the extent that it would reward scarcity, for the factor that the Spaniards
came to own, land, was abundant» (Salvucci forthcoming, pp. 4 and 6).
6. INEQUALITY STABILITY? THE LIKELY IMPACT OF THE 16TH
CENTURY DEMOGRAPHIC DISASTER
As is well known, European disease caused immense demographic
damage to the indigenous population over the century following Columbus’s
9 Michael Smith (1992, Table 12.8, p. 359) reports measures of inequality for rural Aztec society
about the time of the Iberian conquest. These are based on housing remains, and for what Smith
calls «architectural inequality». For two sites, each sampled from the early and late Cuauhnahuac
period, the average Gini is 13.1, well below our estimate of 22.5 reported in the text.
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first voyage, due to soaring mortality rates. Massimo Livi-Bacci (2006) thinks
that it shrank by more than 90 per cent by the early 17th century, and the recent
surveys by Carlos Assadourian (2006) and Linda Newson (2006) agree with
him. In fact, some have argued that the pre-Iberian empires were in Malthusian
crisis and thus would have undergone a population collapse without the
Iberian colonization. In any case, Angus Maddison thinks that the shrinking
was a bit smaller, and Table 3 uses Maddison to take the lower bound. The
Atlantic slave trade tried to substitute African slaves for decimated indigenous
populations but their addition was far smaller than the subtraction caused by
European disease, except for the Caribbean and Brazilian coast (Assadourian
2006, p. 276; Newson 2006, p. 152). Furthermore, the African slaves arrived in
significant numbers only after a long lag. Moreover, not many were transported
to the once densely populated highlands where three-quarters of the indigen-
ous population lived in 1492 (Newson 2006, Table 5.1), but rather to the sugar-
rich tropics. Of course, the demographic collapse raised the per capita income
of the indigenous survivors who resettled on the best lands (Bates et al. 2007,
pp. 919-920)10.
It is useful to elaborate the last point: the demographic disaster in Latin
America must have contributed to higher (but unknown) GDP per capita
and average labor productivity, higher marginal productivity of labor and
lower marginal productivity of land, suggesting that the wage–rent ratio (w/r)
went up and that inequality went down. The economics can be made a little
more precise. Assume that only land (R) and labor (L) mattered in the early
colonial economy, and that technology (A) was unchanged across the 16th
century. If we also assume constant returns to scale, then it follows that:
Y ¼AR aLb; aþ b¼1;
Y=L¼AðR=LÞa¼ y¼GDP per capita:
The marginal product of labor and land are, respectively,
dY=dL¼ bðY=LÞ¼w; dY=dR¼ aðY=RÞ ¼ r
so,
w=r¼ ðb=aÞðR=LÞ
Thus, w/r rises with the land–labor ratio, and the elasticity relating the
two is (under these assumptions) always 1.
The elasticity of GDP per capita to the land–labor ratio is a. Table 3 reports
that population density fell by 51 per cent between 1500 and 1600 (from 1.60 to
10 Note the demographic parallel with Alwyn Young’s argument that today’s HIV-AIDS raises
the incomes of those Africans who survive the disease (Young 2005), or Joel Mokyr’s argument that
the Irish famine in the late 1840s raised per capita income of the survivors (Mokyr 1983).
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0.78 persons per km2)11, implying that the land–labor ratio rose about 103 per
cent (from 0.63 to 1.28 km2 per person). If a50.5, then GDP per capita might
have increased by about 52 per cent over the century. John Coatsworth (2008,
p. 548) is in agreement: «As European disease and abuse decimated indigenous
populations y per capita output rose y Additional gains in productivity
occurred when those who survived found work, resettled or were «congregated»
on the most productive lands». And what went up, then went down. As the
indigenous population slowly recovered between 1600 and 1700, the land–labor
ratio fell about 29 per cent, implying that GDP per capita might have decreased
by almost 15 per cent, at least in the Latin American interior. Coatsworth (2008,
p. 548) thinks that the fall was even bigger in Mexico. Of course, things were
different in the sugar-based plantation islands of the Caribbean.
According to the simple economics above, the percentage rise in the
wage-–rent ratio across the 16th century would have been about the same as
the percentage fall in the labor–land ratio12. If population fell by Livi–Bacci’s
90 per cent (from an index of 100 to 10), then the land–labor ratio rose by a
factor of 10 (from an index of 10 to 100)13, which implies that w/r rose by a
factor of 10 as well. Based instead on Maddison’s population estimates, Table
3 implies that the land–labor ratio more than doubled.
This analysis makes two assumptions that historians of the period would
challenge vigorously. First, we have assumed perfect competition which is, of
course, completely inconsistent with our knowledge that Iberian colonists
introduced coercive and repressive devices so that labor’s greater scarcity
was not fully rewarded. In more formal terms, the Iberians used slavery,
haciendas, mita, encomienda and other institutions to push the wage below
labor’s marginal product (Assadourian 2006, pp. 293-314; Coatsworth 2008;
Be´rtola et al. 2010, pp. 6-8). Indeed, had
«the Spaniards y been constrained to bid for [their] services, one
would have expected the real rewards to the indigenous population to
have soared. There is nothing mysterious about this: it is called supply
and demand. And supply and demand was clearly on the side of the
Indians [and their complements]» (Salvucci forthcoming, p. 16).
11 Salvucci (2009, pp. 12-13) thinks that the fall in density was even bigger, 85 per cent, but we
are taking a lower-bound estimate here.
12 The economics is very simple, and complexity would diminish the size of the demographic
disaster effects estimated here, but not the direction. For example, if land supply was very elastic (as it
probably was in the Americas), then the impact on the land–labor ratio would be diminished. To take
another example, while the assumption of constant technology across the 16th century is analytically
convenient, technological transfer from Europe and mining development must have increased A in the
formal output per worker expression in the text. This point is expanded below.
13 The cultivatable land area of Latin America was 10.966 million km2 between 1500 and 1800.
Livi-Bacci’s 50 million pre-conquest population implies a population density of 4.56. His 3-4
(say 3.5) million estimate for c1700 implies a density of 0.31, a spectacular fall of population density
over the 16th century.
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The logical response of the Spaniards was to control labor markets (Salvucci
forthcoming, pp. 16-17). Almost four decades ago, Shane Hunt (1972) wrote an
impressive (but unpublished) paper describing the evolution of the colonial
institutions that extracted the surplus. While Hunt’s Domar-like analysis shows
how these coercive institutions kept the wage down during the 16th century
demographic disaster, his economic analysis shows clearly that hacienda prof-
itability and implicit rents must have fallen, raising the implicit w/r.
Still, the demographically induced rise in the w/r must have been con-
siderably less than 100 per cent. But, even if it was only 10 or 20 per cent, it
implies pronounced downward pressure on inequality across the 16th cen-
tury. Furthermore, it seems likely that land concentration also diminished
as labor got scarcer (and the munifundios per family got bigger and/or land
use per hacienda got smaller), so there are other reasons to believe that
exogenous demographic trends put strong downward pressure on inequality
across the 16th century. On the other hand, improved productivity in
extracting minerals from the mines as well as any general improvement
in economy-wide productivity (e.g. a rise in A) might have pushed inequality
in the opposite direction, upwards.
The second assumption that specialists might well want to challenge is that
the available land stock remained unchanged in response to the demographic
collapse. Since the pre-Iberian empires had developed intensive agriculture with
irrigation and other infrastructure, and since that infrastructure decayed in the
absence of a large collective labor input to maintain it (Assadourian 2006,
pp. 278-293), the effective stock of land may have diminished, implying a smaller
rise in the land–labor ratio. Still, the stock of animals soared across the
16th century, easily offsetting any fall in the land stock14.
What was the net effect of the demographic disaster on income distribu-
tion? Quantitative evidence is non-existent, but there is some qualitative evi-
dence supporting a rise in the relative economic position of labor: Indians fled
their communities and coerced labor in large numbers took up employment in
Spanish towns, estates or as forasteros in other Indian communities where
living standards were much higher, and employers increasingly offered
workers marginal land on which to grow subsistence crops (Newson 2006,
pp. 175-177). Furthermore, some time ago, Sherburne Borah and Woodrow
Cook (1958, p. 39) argued that real wages of unskilled labor did indeed rise
across the 16th century. Until future research can test what seems to be a
plausible working hypothesis of increased labor scarcity, Table 3 uses it to
predict that after the first decades of colonization, there was very little
additional change in Latin American inequality up to 1600. Indeed,
inequality may even have fallen.
14 The per annum growth rates of livestock 1560-1620 are truly impressive with cattle 3.9-4.3
per cent and sheep and goats 2.3-4 per cent, let alone beasts of burden, like donkeys, mules and
horses (Assadourian 2006, p. 300).
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7. INEQUALITY RISE: WHAT DID LATIN AMERICAN INEQUALITY
LOOK LIKE IN 1790?
Over the two centuries between 1600 and 1820, a number of funda-
mentals were at work in Latin America which would have served to raise
inequality and extraction ratios. First and foremost, populations partially
recovered their 16th century losses. Interpolating 1790 from Maddison’s
(2008) estimates for 1700 and 1820 yields a rise in population from 8.6
million in 1600 to 12.5 million in 1790. Thus, population density rose from
about 0.78 to 1.14, and land–labor ratio fell by about 31 per cent. Second,
GDP per capita rose from 438 to 650, or almost by half, and urbanization
rose from 9 to 14.2 per cent, or by more than half. These forces imply that
the Gini might have risen from 36.2 to 57.6, which, according to the
Table 3 predictions, implies that over the three centuries after 1491, Latin
American inequality reached its peak in the late colonial decades just before
independence.
8. REVOLUTION, INDEPENDENCE AND LOST DECADES
While revolution, independence and the «lost decades» that followed up to
about 1870 (Bates et al. 2007) were very complicated times, and while there
must have been many forces at work influencing inequality, the ancient
inequality regression predicts that the Gini probably dropped from 57.6 in 1790
to 46.4 in 1870. The biggest force contributing to the fall was, of course, inde-
pendence and de-colonization since the five «lost decades» between the 1820s
and the 1870 yielded very little GDP per capita growth15 or urbanization.
Mexico repeats the Latin American (predicted) trends, its Gini falling from 57.7
to 44 between 1790 and 1870, and, once again, by far the biggest fall being
between 1790 and 1820, from 57.7 to 47.8. Ongoing research by Amilcar Challu
reports a social table for 1844 Quere´taro yielding a Gini of 51.316, which implies
that most of the fall between 1790 and 1870 had taken place by the 1840s.
Recent archival work by Leticia Arroyo Abad (2008, Figure 1) confirms
this prediction of falling inequality after independence. She uses data on
wage rates and land rents to infer inequality trends. When her rent–wage
15 Debate over Angus Maddison’s data is intense, but some adopt his more positive view of
Latin American growth 1820-1870. See, for example, Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2007, 2009).
However, even Prados’ more rosy view of post-independence is consistent with very poor growth
performance (Prados 2007, Table 1.4): between 1820 and 1850, the two biggest republics, Brazil and
Mexico, grew at 0 and 0.1 per cent per annum, respectively; in the 1850s, the figures were 20.1 and
21.3. Lost decades indeed!
16 In personal correspondence, Challu has described Quere´taro as quite representative. For
example, Challu estimates per capita income in mid-century at about 43 pesos, which is within the
range of GDP per capita estimates for Mexico offered by Richard Salvucci (1997) and John
Coatsworth (2003, 2005).
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ratios for Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela are weighted by 1850 popula-
tions, the resulting Latin American rent–wage ratio falls by 11 per cent
between 1820 and 1850, and for Mexico alone the fall is 12 per cent. Fur-
thermore, the Arroyo Abad Mexican rent–wage ratio trends and the Mexican
Gini coefficients coming from the social tables in Table 3 are closely repro-
duced by the Amilcar Challu rent–wage series for central Mexico 1780-1869
reported in Table 4. Challu’s inequality index rises by 38 per cent from the
1780s to the 1800s, falls by 29 per cent from the 1800s to the 1820s and then
continues a slow downward drift during the «lost decades» up to the 1860s.
To summarize, the Arroyo Abad index falls by 4 per cent per decade between
1820 and 1850, the Challu index falls by 5.2 per cent per decade between
1820 and 1869, and our Gini in Table 3 falls by almost 2 per cent per decade
between 1820 and 1870.
What this analysis ignores is the boom in the Latin American terms of
trade towards the end of the «lost decades» in the 1860s. While 1870 is the
usual date taken for the start of the belle e´poque, in fact the region’s terms of
trade soared over the previous decade. Indeed, over the 15 years 1859-1874,
the region’s terms of trade rose 24 per cent (Williamson 2008). While the
poor growth performance during the lost decades would have put the lid on
inequality rises, the terms of trade boom across the 1860s must have lifted
TABLE 4
AN INEQUALITY PROXY FOR CENTRAL MEXICO: HACIENDA LAND RENTS PER
HECTARE RELATIVE TO CITY UNSKILLED WAGES 1780-1869
Decade Land rent/unskilled wage
1780-1789 62.0
1790-1799 72.5
1800-1809 100.0
1810-1819 80.0
1820-1829 71.0
1830-1839 77.2
1840-1849 78.7
1850-1859 60.8
1860-1869 52.6
Sources and notes: Land rents are constructed from data taken from personal correspondence with
Amilcar Challu, who collected the central Mexican hacienda data from secondary sources. Land rent is
assumed to trend like land values since documents suggest that land rents were stable at 5% of land values
at least through the 1830s. Unskilled urban wages are taken from Dobado Gonza´les et al. (2008, Table A1,
p. 46), and are for Mexico City. The decade wage average 1860-1869 is for 1860 only.
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that lid. How much, we do not yet know, but Latin American inequality must
have begun to rise a decade or two before the start of the belle e´poque.
9. CREATING MODERN INEQUALITY DURING THE BELLE E´POQUE
GLOBALIZATION BOOM
Latin America faced a rising terms of trade throughout the late 19th century,
as commodity prices boomed. Since it was a primary product exporter, land
and mineral rents were driven up relative to wages. This happened everywhere
around the poor periphery (Williamson 2002, 2008; Coatsworth 2008, pp. 567-
568), but it was especially dramatic in Latin America partly because the region
was able to expand its export sectors so effectively, thus to become very large
shares in GDP (Williamson forthcoming, Table 4.1). Since land and mineral
resources were held by those at the top, inequality rose as well. Not too long
ago, the only data we had to judge the magnitude of these inequality trends
were proxies, like the land rent to unskilled wage ratio or the GDP per worker
to unskilled wage ratio (Williamson 1999, 2002). Thus, when the rent–wage
ratio for Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela (Arroyo Abad 2008,
Figure 1) are weighted by 1890 populations, the Latin American average rises
7.9 per cent per decade 1850-1870 and 6.3 per cent per decade 1870-1900, for a
total increase of 37 per cent after 1850. Thus, this rent–wage proxy implies a
big inequality surge over the second half of the century. We also have the more
comprehensive belle e´poque inequality evidence for Brazil and the Southern
Cone summarized in Table 5. It comes from two sources: first, Ginis calculated
from new evidence collected by Luis Be´rtola and Rodrı´quez Weber (2009,
Table 4), and second, what Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2007, Table 12.1)
calls his backward projected Pseudo-Ginis (P-Ginis). They tell the same qua-
litative tale: inequality rose by 23 per cent over the belle e´poque (the average of
the Be´rtola and Prados’ estimated figures). In fact, the Latin American
weighted average in Table 5 misses the heavily populated Mexican and Andean
republics. However, Prados de la Escosura also shows that a Mexican
inequality proxy — income per worker relative to the unskilled wage ratio —
rose by about 2.8 times between the early 1880s and 1920 (Prados de la
Escosura 2007, Figure 12.1b), suggesting that Mexico followed Brazil and the
Southern Cone up a steep inequality slope. Furthermore, the Arroyo Abad
rent–wage inequality proxy for Mexico confirms the Prados’s data since the
1870-1900 increase was 27 per cent over the three decades. Assuming, there-
fore, that Mexican inequality rose more like the Prados’s P-Ginis for all of Latin
America than the Be´rtola Ginis for Brazil and the Southern Cone, it follows
that Latin American inequality probably rose by something like 30 per cent
over the belle e´poque. Applying that increase to the 1870 Latin American Gini
coefficient in Table 3 would imply that it rose from 46.4 to 60.3, making
the Gini in the 1920s the highest that Latin America had recorded since
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TABLE 5
BRAZIL AND SOUTHERN CONE INEQUALITY TRENDS 1870-1920
Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay Region
Gini P-Gini Gini P-Gini Gini P-Gini Gini P-Gini Gini P-Gini
1870 52.2 39.1 54.8 32.9 59.4 41.3 48.1 29.6 54.6 34.8
1920 57.4 49.3 59.7 47.2 64.1 49.2 56.2 36.6 59.6 47.5
% Change 10.0 26.1 8.9 43.5 7.9 19.1 16.8 23.6 9.2 36.5
Sources: Ginis for 1870 and 1920 from Be´rtola et al. (2010, Table 4). Pseudo-Ginis (P-Gini) for 1870 and 1929, from Prados (2007, Table 12.1).
Notes: The region weighted Gini averages use 1900 population as weights. The P-Gini is derived from backward projection (see Prados de la Escosura
2007, Table 12.2).
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pre-conquest, even higher than the 1790 colonial peak (57.6), and much,
much higher than 1600 (36.2), or even 1700 (48.5).
10. REVISIONIST HYPOTHESES
Figure 2 plots our inequality predictions from 1491 to 1929. However
crude the evidence may seem, it points to several revisionist interpretations
of, or hypotheses about, 500 years of Latin American inequality.
First, it is simply not true that Latin America has always been unequal. It
cannot be stressed enough that this is a comparative statement. Only by
comparison with other times and places can statements about Latin American
inequality offer any useful meaning. While comparisons with the United States
are not uncommon in the recent literature, comparisons with the European
(colonial) leaders or with other parts of the poor periphery are rarely, if ever,
made. When such comparisons are made (Table 2), income inequality in pre-
industrial Latin America is found to have been no higher than northwest
Europe. To repeat, it is not true that pre-industrial Latin America (pre-1880)
FIGURE 2
LIKELY INEQUALITY TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA 1491-1929
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was more unequal than pre-industrial northwest Europe (pre-1800). Thus, if it
is thought that inequality encouraged rent-seeking, suppressed private property
rights, retarded the development of «good» institutions, and thus discouraged
growth in Latin America, it must have done the same in northwest Europe
where the industrial revolution first started! In addition, it appears that pre-
conquest Latin America had one of the lowest, if not the lowest, level of
inequality anywhere in the poor periphery. It also appears that Latin American
inequality remained one of the lowest anywhere around the world until the
start of the 17th century. It can hardly be said that initial endowments and
Iberian colonization made Latin America more unequal than other places.
Second, Latin America was poorer than northwest Europe, and poorer
societies have smaller surpluses for the elite to extract. Thus, while inequality
was lower, what this paper and Milanovic et al. (2008) call extraction rates
(how much of the available surplus was actually extracted by the elite) were
considerably higher in Latin America than in northwest Europe. Whether
measured inequality or extraction rates are the best indicators of pro-rent-
seeking and anti-growth institutions is an issue that needs to be resolved
since they offer very different inferences regarding Latin American growth
underachievement. Presumably, political inequality had an important influ-
ence on the size of the extraction ratio.
Third, Latin American inequality over the five centuries from pre-conquest
to the present has exhibited immense variance. Indeed, Latin America exhib-
ited more inequality variance between 1491 and 1929 (Ginis ranging from 22.5
to 60.3) than one can find between Latin America, Europe and East Asia today
(51, 34 and 38, respectively: Lo´pez and Perry 2008, pp. 2-3). While the historical
literature certainly offers strong opinions about potential explanations, we
need far more evidence to document them firmly. By replacing less rapacious
indigenous elite with more rapacious European elite, the Iberian conquest
appears to have raised, initially, inequality by about half. Yet, the 16th century
saw very little further rise in inequality, most probably because the demo-
graphic disaster produced a powerful downward offset to all other inequality-
increasing forces. It looks like the two centuries up to about 1790 or so saw the
biggest increase in Latin American inequality, reaching its colonial peak in that
year (Gini 57.6; Table 3), or shortly thereafter (Table 4). What are the expla-
nations for the colonial inequality boom? Was it simply driven by increases in
GDP per capita and thus in the surplus available for the elite to extract? Or, did
the elite learn more effective ways to extract a bigger share of the same surplus?
Or was it both? In any case, about half of that huge rise up to 1790 was eroded
by three decades of war and independence, followed by five post-independence
«lost decades» of economic stagnation. Thus, by 1870 inequality in Latin
America was not much different than it was for all pre-industrial societies for
which we can get the data. To repeat, while inequality was high in Latin
America, as it was poised for its industrial revolution, it was no higher than the
average pre-industrial society, nor higher than industrializing Europe.
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Fourth, globalization forces during the belle e´poque pushed Latin American
inequality up to historic highs by the 1920s. Although that belle e´poque
inequality boom cannot yet be adequately measured for all of Latin America, it
looks like ongoing research will shortly do so (e.g. Be´rtola 2005; Be´rtola
et al. 2010). Other primary product exporters underwent similar inequality-
enhancing booms over that half century too (Williamson 2002; 2006), but it
appears that Latin America had one of the biggest inequality booms, and, even
more notable, that the high inequality achieved persisted (and even increased)
during the anti-global episode between the 1920s and the 1970s (Prados de
la Escosura 2007, Table 12.1). The latter offers a striking contrast with the
industrialized world which underwent a great egalitarian leveling across the
mid-20th century (Williamson and Lindert 1980, pp. 53-62; Atkinson and
Piketty 2008; Atkinson et al. 2009).
The inequality history that makes Latin America distinctive stretches across
the 20th century when Europe and its English-speaking offshoots underwent a
secular decline in inequality correlated with the rise of the welfare state. Latin
America did not share that 20th century decline. Why has 20th century Latin
American inequality history been so unique, while everything else about its
inequality history from 1491 to the 1920s was so ordinary?
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